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The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of
Congressional Power?
Shawn Jensvold*

[L]egislatures cannot invent too many devices for subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go
hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind. 1
It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in religious opinion and duties was meant to be precluded by the
public authorities, as indifferent to the interests of society.
On the contrary, the relations which exist between man and
his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are
the most interesting and important to every human being,
and the most incumbent on his study and investigation?
--Thomas Jefferson
I. INTRODUCTION

In response to the substantial increase in litigation over conflicts between land use regulations and religious assembly, 3 Congress passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA"), 4 signed into law on September 22, 2000. RLUIPA is a targeted bill that prohibits the government from, inter alia, substantially
burdening religious assembly. 5 RLUIPA protects religious assembly in
Copyright © 200 I by Shawn Jcnsvold, J.D. candidate, 2002, University of California,
Davis School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Alan Brownstein for his invaluable
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to professor Debra Bassett for reviewing the citations. Of
course, any analytical or other errors must be attributed solely to the author.
I. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Oct. 28, 1785, reprinted in 8THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
2. Thomas Jefferson, Minutes of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia (Oct. 7,
1822), reprinted in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
3. See, e.g., Von G. Keetch and Matthew K. Richards, The Needfi>r Legislation to Enshrine
Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 725 (1999); Douglas Laycock, State
RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755 (1999). Mr. Keetch is a partner at the
law firm of Kirton & McConkie in Salt Lake City. Professor Laycock serves as the Alice McKean
Young Regents Chair in Law at the University ofTexas at Austin.
4. Pub. L. No. 106-274, I, 114 Stat. 803 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000cc) [RLUIPA].
5. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)(l ). The First Amend-
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two particular areas. First, it precludes the government from imposing
substantial burdens upon the religious practices of individuals, assemblies, and institutions through land use regulations. 6 In a following section, RLUIPA protects the religious rights of prisoners. 7 Regarding land
use regulations, RLUIPA applies only to the extent that Congress has
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Under RLUIPA, if a government substantially burdens the exercise
of religion through a land use regulation, it must demonstrate that the
imposition of the burden serves a compelling state interest and is the
least restrictive means for furthering that interest. 9 RLUIPA also prohibits governments from imposing or implementing land use regulations that
discriminate against religious assemblies, treating religious assemblies
on "less than equal terms" than secular groups, or totally excluding religious assemblies from particular jurisdictions. 10
This article will focus on the constitutionality of RLUIPA as it pertains to land use regulation. More specifically, it will examine whether
Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing RLUIPA's land use provisions upon the States."
Recently, the Supreme Court restricted Congress's power under Section 5. 12 For a law to be a valid exercise of Congress's power under Section 5:
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking
such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and
13
effect.

ment's Free Exercise Clause protects religious assembly. The First Amendment states: "Congress
shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act§ 2(a)( I).
7. See id. § 3.
8. See id. §§ 2(a)(2)(a)-(c).
9. See id. § 2(a)( I). The compelling state interest and least restrictive means tests are collectively known as "strict scrutiny."
10. !d.§§ 2(b)(l)-(3).
II. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 5. This
paper will not address questions regarding institutionalized persons, or Congress's power to regulate
land use regulations under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. This is a legitimate analytical exercise, because RLUIPA contains a "severability" clause. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act § 5(i). Thus, if the Court strikes down one section of the act as unconstitutional, the
other sections remain in force.
12. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) on grounds that Congress exceeded its Section 5 enforcement
power). For further discussion of Flores and RFRA, see infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
13. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
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Stated another way, any legislation enacted under Congress's Section
5 power must remedy or prevent 14 a violation of the substantive provisions of Section l of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Supreme Court
has interpreted it. 15 If the legislation does not remedy or prevent such a
violation, then it does not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather
attempts to alter the meaning of the constitutional provision(s) at issue. 16
It is the responsibility of the courts, not Congress, to interpret the Constitution, and nothing in Section 5 suggests otherwise. 17
In response to the Court's "congruence and proportionality" requirement, RLUIPA's legislative history is replete with examples where
land use regulations have suppressed religious assembly. 18 Critics of
RLUIPA, however, argue that these examples do not demonstrate a "pattern of 'widespread and persisting' constitutional violations by the
states." 19 Instead of remedying or preventing religious discrimination,
RLUIPA, its detractors maintain, is an unconstitutional intrusion upon
the rights of local governments to control the use of land within their respective jurisdictions. 20
Related to the issue of whether RLUIPA is remedial or preventive
are general concerns over federalism. Because local governments retain
almost exclusive control over land use, RLUIPA's critics argue that the
law is inconsistent with the Constitution's general principles of federalism and the specific language of the Tenth Amendment. 21 As a federal
regulation requiring judicial review of Free Exercise challenges to land
use regulations, RLUIPA, critics fear, will preclude the people, acting

14. "Remedial" implies relief for existing constitutional violations, while "preventive" indicates a prophylactic function.
15. Section I states that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,~ I.
16. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.").
18. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. El564 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (document submitted by Rep.
Hyde).
19. Marci Hamilton. letter to U.S. Senate on behalf of the National League of Cities (July 24,
2000) [hereinafter Hamilton letter] (on file with author and available at author's personal web site:
<http://www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/rluipaJetter.htm>) (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 526). Professor Hamilton is a Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and was the lead counsel
for the City of Boerne in Flores.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. See, e.g., id. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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through their local governments, from controlling land use within their
communities. 22
RLUIPA is a carefully crafted piece of legislation, despite the valid
concerns over the Act's seemingly expansive control over land use regulations offered by local government officials, legal scholars, and others.
Indeed, the language of RLUIPA clearly indicates that Congress attempted to address the Court's concerns in Flores concerning the scope
of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23
The factors that will determine whether RLUIP A will survive judicial review and succeed in protecting religion against land use discrimination
are the focus of this article.
II. RLUIPA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

A. Employment Division v. Smith 24 and the Demise ofStrict Scrutiny
Before analyzing the constitutional merits of RLUIPA, it is useful to
briefly examine the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the Free Exercise Clause. The compelling state interest test that RLUIPA requires for
land use regulations when they substantially burden religious exercise
25
has its roots in the Supreme Court's early Free Exercise Clause cases.
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court, in perhaps its most unpopular
decision of the latter half of the twentieth century, virtually abandoned
the use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases. 26 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court in Smith, stated that the Court had "never held that
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."27 The Court cited numerous cases to support its holding that strict
scrutiny does not apply to cases where individuals request relief from
obedience to neutral laws of general applicability. n
22. See. e.g., Hamilton Letter, supra note 19.
23. See injra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
24. 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990).
25. The Court first applied the compelling state interest test to the Free Exercise Clause in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In theory, the compelling state interest test represents the
appropriate standard of review for free exercise claims. The Court's commitment to strict scrutiny in
the intervening years between Sherbert and Smith, however, was checkered at best. For instance, the
Court rarely used strict scrutiny to grant religious believers exceptions to otherwise valid laws. See
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,446 (1994).
26. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
27. !d. at 878-79.
28. !d. at 879-81. For instance, the Court noted that in Braunjetd v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
( 1961 ), a plurality upheld Sunday-closing laws against a claim that they burdened the religious prac-
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The Court did, however, note two categories of cases where the Free
Exercise Clause continued to require strict scrutiny review of neutral,
generally applicable laws. 29 The first category is one that the Court
termed "hybrid rights. " 30 The second exceptional category pertains to
laws that allow for individualized governmental assessment. 31
The Court declared that "where the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 32 The Court's primary example of a law requiring individualized governmental assessment was the unemployment compensation program in Sherbert. 33 The
Court explained that the "without good cause" standard employed in
South Carolina's unemployment compensation program "created a
mechanism for individualized exemptions." 34

B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Congress's Failed Attempt to
Restore Strict Scrutiny
Following Smith, many commentators expressed serious concern
over the protection of religious freedom in America. 35 The concern of legal scholars soon spread to Congress, which enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 36 RFRA's existence, however,
was short-lived. In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 37 the Court declared
tices of those whose faiths compelled them to refrain from work on other days. See Smith, 494 U.S.
at 880. The Court also noted United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 ( 1982), where it rejected an Amish
employer's claim that it should be exempted from Social Security taxes because the Amish faith
prohibited participation in government support programs. See Smith, 494 U.S. at880.
29. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
30. !d. Hybrid rights claims involve not only the Free Exercise Clause, but "other constitutional protections such as freedom of speech and of the press." !d.
31. See id. at 884.
32. !d. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,708 (1976)).
33. See id. at R84.
34. !d. (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708). In Sherhert, South Carolina's Unemployment
Compensation Act denied eligibility for benefits to claimants who refused to accept available work
"without good cause." Sherhert, 374 U.S. at 400. In Smith, however. the Court held that the individualized assessment exception did not apply to Oregon drug laws that prohibited the ingestion of
peyote, a controlled substance. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882, 884-85.
35. See, e.g .. Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of" Religious Freedom, I 07 HARV. L. RI'V.
118, 121-23, 135-40 ( 1'193) (defending strict scrutiny of governmental laws affecting religious conduct); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of" Free Exercise, 1990 Sur. CT. REV. I, 4 (lamenting the
Smith Court's decision to defer to all facially neutral laws burdening religion); hut see, e.g., Herbert
W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present, and Future, REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 29-33 (1995)
(contending that the Smith decision actually strengthened religious freedom by instituting a brightline test).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. ~ 2000bb (1994). Congress enacted RFRA primarily to reverse the effect of
Smith and restore the compelling state interest as the standard of review in cases where "religious
exercise is substantially burdened by the government." ld at~~ 2000bb(a)(5), (b)( I )-(2).
37. 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997).
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RFRA to be unconstitutional. The Court held that in enacting RFRA,
Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3x
The Court's decision in Flores generated nearly as much scholarly
commentary as Smith. 39 One commentator took the unique approach of
examining what Congress could do to protect religious freedom in light
40
41
of RFRA's demise. In his article, Daniel 0. Conkle argued that Congress could draft legislation grounded on alternative sources of power
such as the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause. 42 Professor Conkle
also suggested that Congress could ground alternative legislation on its
enforcement power under Section 5, but such a law would have to be
much more narrowly tailored than RFRA in order to meet Flores's "congruence and proportionality" requirement. 43 According to Professor
Conkle, one method by which Congress could achieve such narrow tailoring would be to target specific "governmental practices that are likely
to reflect [religious] discrimination.',4 4 One such governmental practice is
45
land use regulation.
C. RLUJPA: Congress's Latest Attempt to Protect Religious Freedom
RLUIPA's land use provisions track some of Professor Conkle's
46
suggestions remarkably well. In section 2(a), for example, RLUIPA
stipulates:
(a) Substantial Burdens

38. See id. The Court stated that Congress's powers under Section 5---the Enforcement
Clause--were remedial and preventive, not substantive, in nature. /d. at 520. Because RFRA was
designed solely to overturn Smith, the Court concluded, it represented a substantive, rather than remedial or preventive, action. See id. at 512, 532.
39. See. e.g., MarciA. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A LandmarkjiJr Structural Analysis, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 ( 1998) (analyzing the constitutional principles supporting the Flores decision); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulf.i· in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743 (1998) (arguing that RFRA was indistinguishable from various other statutes Congress
passed under its Section 5 power).
40. See Daniel 0. Conkle. Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role ol Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom Ji'om State and Local ln.fi'ingement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633 (1998).
4 I. Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, and Adjunct Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington.
42. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake o{City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role ol Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 646 ( 1998).
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520; see Conkle, supra note 42 at 647.
44. See Conkle, supra note 42, at 650.
45. See id.
46. Compare Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a), with Conkle, supra note 42, at 646-50.
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(I) General rule. No government shall impose or implement a land usc
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person, assembly, or institution
(a) is in the furtherance of a compelling state interest; and
(b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest
(2)Scope olapplication. This subsection applies in any case in which--

(a) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability;
(b) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several states,
or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability; or
(c) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land
use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of
the proposed uses for the property involved.
Section 2(a)( I) of RLUIPA is similar to RFRA in that it attempts to
reinstate strict scrutiny as the standard of review for cases involving governmental imposition of substantial burdens upon religious expression. In
section 2(a)(2), however, RLUIPA diverges significantly from RFRA.
In sections 2(a)(2)(a)-(b), Congress grounded RLUIPA on its regula47
tory powers under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, respectively.
Important to the present analysis, however, is section 2(a)(2)(c), which is
grounded on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 x A premise underlying this section of RLUIPA is that many land use regulations, as
applied by local officials, fall within the "individualized assessments"
category of cases identified in Smith. If this premise is correct, then sec49
tion 2(a)(2)(c) is likely constitutional. This section of RLUIPA would
47. Sec Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act§§ 2(a)(2)(a)-(b); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 8.
48. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)(2)(c) does not specifically
mention Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but because it is not grounded upon any of Congress's powers enumerated in Article l, Section 5 is the only available source through which Congress may enact such a provision.
49. Even assuming the constitutionality of§ 2(a)(2)(c), Congress still may have exceeded its
power under the Enforcement Clause in§ 2(b). See infra notes 174-184 and accompanying text.
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be a valid exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause power because it
merely clarifies the Court's own holding that laws which provide governmental officials with the power to make individualized assessments
are not generally applicable, and therefore, require strict scrutiny review.50
Ill. RLUIPA, LAND USE REGULATIONS, AND SMITH'S INDIVIDUALIZED
ASSESSMENTS EXCEPTION
This section will analyze the validity of the assumption underlying
section 2(a)(2)(c) ofRLUIPA-that most land use regulations, as applied
in free exercise cases, fall within Smith's individualized assessments exception. First, it will examine American land use regulations and the
level of discretionary decision-making power they provide government
officials. Second, it will review the application of the Smith exception in
existing case law, including its level of compatibility with land use regulations.

A. American Land Use Regulations and the Level of Individualized
Discretion They Provide Government Officials
Of the various types of land use regulations, zoning laws are the target of the vast majority of free exercise challenges. Consequently, this
analysis will focus on the level of discretionary decision-making that
zoning laws in America generally provide to local governing bodies. 51
In 1916, New York City passed the first zoning ordinance in the
United States. 52 Ten years after the passage of the first zoning ordinance,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such regulations. 53
Around the same time, the Commerce Department drafted the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (Standard Act). The Commerce Department
designed the Standard Act as a zoning legislative model, through which
state could, among other things, "lessen congestion in the
streets; ... secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; ... promote

50. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85; cf Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 ("When the political branches
of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued. it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents
with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed."). Section 2(a)(2)(c), unlike RFRA, would not negate the basic holding of
Smith, and therefore would not undercut stare decisis.
51. Landmark preservation laws also frequently appear in free exercise claims. Landmark
preservation laws, however, operate in similar fashions to zoning ordinances. See infra notes 127135, 166-170 and accompanying text.
52. See l ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONINC> § 1.02, at 6 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th
ed. 1996) [hereinafter l ANDERSON'S].
53. See Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 3XX ( 1926 ).
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health and the general welfare; ... [and] avoid undue concentration of the
population." 54 Eventually, all states passed zoning enabling legislation,
most of which reflect the intentions of the Standard Act. 5 5
The Standard Act granted power to state legislatures to pass and
amend zoning enabling legislation. 56 Municipalities, however, held the
responsibilities of dividing their respective lands into districts of varying
types to best carry out the purposes of the Standard Act. 57 The Standard
Act authorized municipalities to create "boards of adjustment," which
could "make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in harmony
with its general purpose and intent." 58 The primary device the Standard
Act provided to boards of adjustment for making exceptions to the terms
of zoning ordinances was the hardship variance. 59
Zoning boards of adjustment are independent administrative bodies
that act in a quasi-judicial capacity to grant variances and other exceptions to zoning ordinances. 60 "A variance is an authorization for the construction or maintenance of a building or structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of land, which is prohibited by a zoning
ordinance."61 Adjustment boards grant variances primarily to parties who
demonstrate that a literal application of a zoning ordinance will cause
them "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship." 62
As municipalities throughout the nation were implementing zoning
ordinances, some state courts described standards such as "practical difficulties" and "undue hardship" as vague and indefinite, which provided
adjustment boards with nearly unlimited discretion. 63 GraduaJJy, however, most state courts accepted these terms, even though many of them
disagreed as to the level of discretion the terms gave adjustment boards. 64
State courts have differed considerably in their interpretations of the

54

Standard State Zoning Enabling Act§ 3 (1926), reprinted in 5 ANDERSON'S
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 32.01 at 4 (Alan C. Weinstein ed., 4th ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Standard Act].
55. See I ANDERSON'S

S 2.2 I, supra note 52, at 67.

56. See Standard Act § 2.
57. See id.
58. !d. at 6-8.
59. See DANIEL R. MAN DELKER, LAND USE LAW S 4.15, at I 08 (4th ed. 1997).
60. See Rogoff v. Tufariello, 255 A.2d 781, 784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
61. 3 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.02, at 410 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th
ed. 1996) [hereinafter 3 ANDERSON'S].
62. !d. at 412.
63. See, e.g., Speroni v. Board of Appeals, 15 N.E.2d 302, 303 (Ill. 1938).
64. See 3 ANDERSON's § 20.08, supra note 60, at 435 (noting that some state courts considered the meaning of such terms to be commonly understood and thus providing adjustment boards
with reasonable discretion, while others simply accepted that the terms provided boards with broad
general powers, because such discretion was necessary to maintain validity of zoning ordinances).
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meaning of terms such as "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulties."
Universally, American courts have concluded that a financial hardship alone is not sufficient to demonstrate an unnecessary (or undue)
hardship. 1' 5 Beyond that, however, there is considerable disagreement
among the various states. For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that a financial hardship becomes an unnecessary hardship requiring the granting of a variance when conditions unique to the particular property become unduly oppressive. 66 In contrast, a Pennsylvania
court ruled that "unnecessary hardship is a condition which renders a
property almost valueless without the grant of a variance." 67
Although the majority of states follow the New Hampshire example
of defining "unnecessary hardship" broadly, many others have restricted
the definition of the term in a manner similar to the Pennsylvania court. 6 x
Even under the more restrictive definition, though, the authority that zoning adjustment boards possess to grant variances is administrative and
quasi-judicial in nature. 69 Inherent in such authority is the ability to exercise considerable discretion.
Besides variances, the other major category of exceptions to zoning
ordinances is the special permit. 70 There are two major differences between variances and special permits. First, variances allow for uses of
land or construction of structures that are prohibited by the particular
zoning ordinance. 71 In contrast, special permits are granted to uses or
structures that are permitted by the zoning ordinance, but require prior
approval. 72 The second difference is that variances run with the land,
while special permits die with the owner. 73
As with variances, the power of adjustment boards to grant special
permits is also a quasi-judicial, rather than a legislative function. 74 Indeed, because of the different standards governing the exceptions, the
degree of discretionary decision-making power boards of adjustment
employ in granting special permits is arguably greater than with vari-

65.
66.
o7.
68.

See id

~

20.16, al 454.

S('(' Carter v. City of Nashua, 30R A.2d 847, 855 (N.H. 1973).

Schaefer v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 435 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981 ).
See 3 i\NDI·RSON'S 9 20.16, supra note oO, at 460.
69. See id~ 20.04, at 419. The power to grant variances in cases of"practical difficulties" is
identical lo those involving "unnecessary hardship." Only about half of !he state enabling statutes
authorize variances to relieve "practical difficulties." Sec id ~ 20.1 0, at 440.
70. Sci' id 9 20.03, at 414.
71. Sccidat415.
72. S!-'c id
73. Sec id
74. 5ice 3 ANDERSON'S ~ 21.17, at 769.
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ances. The standards governing the issuance of special permits are both
75
broader and more numerous than those associated with variances. For
example, the New York Court of Appeals approved a zoning ordinance
that delegated to the Board of Adjustment the power to grant or deny a
special permit based on the proposed use's effect upon "the public
health, safety and general welfare." 76
The Maryland Court of Appeals also approved an ordinance with
similarly vague language. 77 The court upheld a zoning board's denial of a
discount department store's petition for a special exemption to operate a
gasoline station. The board concluded that the department store failed to
meet the zoning ordinance's requirement that the applicant demonstrate
the existence of a "need' for the proposed gasoline station among the
population in the "general neighborhood."78 The Court of Appeals held
that the words "need" and "general neighborhood" were not so indeterminate as to allow the zoning board to engage in "arbitrary or unreasonable exercise[ s] of power."79
There are numerous other similar standards governing the issuance
of special permits, but the previous examples illustrate sufficiently the
level of discretion zoning ordinances provide adjustment boards and
other governing bodies. Although state courts have struck down ordinances that provide zoning boards with "unlimited discretion to condition the issuance of ... pennit[ s] on the basis of such norms or standards
as [they] may from time to time arbitrarily determine," the level of discretionary decision-making most ordinances provide adjustment boards
is substantial. 80
One final type of zoning exemption is the conditional use. Conditional uses are similar to special uses in that they are permitted within the
zone but typically require prior approval. 81 Conditional uses differ from
special uses, however, because legislative bodies, rather than boards of
adjustment, typically possess the authority to grant conditional use permits.82 For example, the typical application for a conditional use permit
will be sent to the city council for approval instead of a zoning board.
Moreover, conditional use permits, like variances, run with the land. 83

75.
76.
77.
7K
79.
80.
81
82.
83.

See id. § 21.09, at 713-14.
Aloe v. Dassler, I 05 N.E.2d I 04 (N.Y. 1952).
See Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 312 A.2d 758, 767 (Md. 1973).
!d.
/d.(quoting Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 49 A.2d 299, 803 (Md. 1946).
Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand & Gravel Co., 209 A.2d 227,232 (R.I. 1965).
See 3 ANDERSON'S ~ 20.05, supra note 60, at 421.
See id.
See, County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1977).
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Despite these differences, the level of discretion provided to municipalities in granting conditional use permits is remarkably similar to that
given to adjustment boards for granting special use permits.x 4 The reason
for this is that the standards governing special uses are typically the same
as those for conditional uses. For instance, parties applying for both conditional and special use permits are usually required to demonstrate that
their proposed uses are not "detrimental to public health, safety, or general welfare. ,xs Variance standards such as unnecessary hardship and
practical difficulties do not usually apply to conditional uses.x 6
As the previous analysis has shown, zoning ordinances allow boards
of adjustment and municipalities to make individualized assessments
when evaluating petitions for variances, special uses, and conditional
uses. The critical issue concerning the validity of Section 2(a)(2)(c) of
RLUIPA, however, is whether the level of discretionary decision-making
provided to governmental officials in zoning ordinances is compatible
with the individualized assessment exception defined by the Supreme
Court in Smith.x 7 An appropriate point of comparison, then, is the level of
governmental discretion inherent in unemployment compensations laws
such as the one in Sherbert_xx
In Smith, the Court held that the South Carolina unemployment compensation program at issue in Sherbert "created a mechanism for individualized exemptions" through its "without good cause" standard. x9 The
Court noted that "a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation
programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment." 90 A comparable situation exists with zoning ordinances.
In evaluating variance requests, for example, zoning boards necessarily examine the "particular circumstances" of the applicant's proposed
use. The previously cited New Hampshire Supreme Court case of Carter
v. City of Nashua 91 provides an excellent illustration. In Carter, the court
upheld a zoning board's granting of a variance permitting the operation
of a dog racing track on the New Hampshire portion of a particular tract
of land that was situated partially in Massachusetts. 92
See 3 i\NDFRSON'S g 20.05, supra note 60, at 421.
Warren v. Collier Township Bd. ofComm'rs, 437 A.2d 86, XX (Pa. Commw. Ct. 198 I).
But see 3 ANDERSO"'s (j 20.05, supra note 60, at 42] (noting that "unnecessary hard"practical difficulties" are used as standards for granting conditional usc variances).
S('e Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01.
Smith, 494 U.S. at X84.
ld (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 70X).
30XA.2d847(N.fL 1973).
92. See id at 856.

84.
85.
86.
ship" and
87.
ll8.
89.
90.
91.
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In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the
trial court's evaluation of the rationale behind the zoning board's decision to grant the variance. 93 First, the trial court determined that the dog
racing track would benefit the business, commercial, and light industrial
areas located within several miles of the tract at issue. 94 Furthermore, the
trial court noted that all of the surrounding property owners had consented to the variance, that there were few residential neighborhoods
near the tract, and that residents approved a referendum on whether a dog
95
track should be located within the city.
Based on Carter, it appears clear that to determine the existence of
an "unnecessary hardship," zoning boards must consider the "particular
circumstances" of the applicant's proposed land use. 96 Therefore, at least
in relation to variances, zoning ordinances create "a mechanism for individualized exemptions." 97
Because the standards governing special use and conditional use
permits are even more indefinite than those associated with variances,
the same conclusion applies. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a
board of adjustment could determine whether a proposed use promotes
"the public health, safety and general welfare" without examining the
specific circumstances of the landowner's claim. 98
In summary, the application of zoning ordinances, through the issuance of variances, special use permits, and conditional use permits, fall
within the Smith court's individualized assessment exception. 99 Consequently under Smith, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
for the majority of claims involving Free Exercise Clause challenges of
zoning ordinances or decisions by zoning boards. 100
A smaller percentage of zoning laws, however, provide minimal or
no discretion to local governmental officials. Some of these ordinances
even contain provisions for variances or special use permits. 101 Other
zoning ordinances apply only to particular tracts of land and allow only a
limited number of uses with no exceptions. These laws provide minimal
93. See id at R55.
94. See id.
95. See id. The trial court examined these various factors as part of its analysis on whether
overturning the variance would constitute an "unnecessary hardship" on the owner.
96. Smith, 494 U.S. at 8S4.
97. !d. (quoting Bowen 476 U.S. at 70S).
98. Aloe v. Dassler, 105 N.E.2d 104, 104 (N.Y 1952).
99. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
I 00. See id at 883.
I 0 I. For example, some zoning ordinances allow for variances or special use permits, but limit
such exceptions to specific uses. The level of discretion provided to government officials is much
less than those that allow exceptions for "unnecessary hardships" or those that promote "public
health, safety. safety and general welfare."
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or no discretion to local government officials. Under the Smith standard,
therefore, such laws would likely be considered generally applicable and
strict scrutiny would not apply.
In the free exercise context, Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of
Hastings 102 presents an example of a zoning ordinance that provides little
discretion to government officials. Cornerstone concerned a church's
challenge of a Hastings, Minnesota zoning ordinance that allowed only
"commercial establishments, public and semi-public buildings, private
clubs, second-floor apartments, parking lots," and other accessory uses
within its central business district. 103 The ordinance also listed other particular uses that could be allowed upon the grant of a special use permit.
Such uses included gas stations, creameries, and hotels, but not
churches. 104
The Hastings ordinance, by granting special use permits only for
specified uses, provided significantly less discretion to government officials than most zoning laws. As noted earlier, most zoning ordinances
that allow boards of adjustment to grant special use permits, do so according to broad standards such as promoting public health and safety.
The Hastings ordinance, however, did not establish indeterminate standards as the means by which special use permits were awarded. Therefore under Smith, strict scrutiny would likely not apply. 105

B. Smith's Individualized Assessments Exception and its Current Use in
Free Exercise Clause Case Law
Despite the existence of some zoning laws that provide little discretion to government officials, the majority of land use regulations provide
government with significant discretionary decision-making power. Consequently, most zoning laws likely fall within Smith's individualized assessments exception. Considering that Smith was decided over ten years
ago, there is very little case law analyzing the Smith exception. Cases
that have interpreted the Smith exception, however, reflect favorably on
its incorporation into the Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
102. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991 ).
103. !d at 4A6.
104. It can be reasonably argued that the Hastings ordinance discriminates against religious
institutions by allowing semi-public buildings and second-floor apartments but not churches and
other worship centers. Worship centers. however, may be more inconsistent with the general plan for
a commercial district than other non-business uses. For example. when "residential or inconsistent
commercial uses intrude [into an area comprised of primarily retail establishments] they create hlank
spaces or even hazards to pedestrian traffic." 2 ANDERSON's AMERICAN LAW m ZoNJN(; ~ 9.42, at
249 (Kenneth H. Young cd., 4th ed. 1996).
105. See Cornerstone, 948 F.2d at 472. The Eighth Circuit cited Smith in denying the church's
free exercise claim. The cmui held that the Hastings ordinance was a neutral law that applied to all
land uses and therefore did not discriminate against religious conduct. See id
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First, the only Supreme Court case discussing the individualized assessments exception is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah. 106 In Lukumi, the Court struck down several city ordinances
prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals as violating the Free Exercise
Clause. 107 In particular, the Court struck down an ordinance that provided
for the punishment of "[ w ]hoever ... unnecessarily ... kills any animal."108 The Court found that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise
Clause because it specifically targeted appellant's religious practice of
animal sacrifice. 109
The Court held that the ordinance was not a neutral, generally applicable law, because while it prohibited killing animals for religious reasons, it allowed other methods of killing animals such as hunting and
euthanasia. 110 The Court further noted that the ordinance's "necessity"
requirement necessitated an evaluation of the particular justification for
killing animals. 111 This, the Court concluded, represented "a system of
'individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct. '" 112
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also decided a case based in part
on its interpretation of the Smith exception. 113 In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, the Third Circuit struck down a Newark Police
Department ordinance that prohibited the wearing of beards. 114 Several
Sunni Muslim officers challenged the policy on free exercise grounds after being disciplined for violating the policy. 115 According to the court, it
is a "major sin" under the Sunni Muslim faith for any male who can
grow a beard to refuse to wear one. 116
The Third Circuit, in striking down the no-beard policy, held that the
police department created not merely a mechanism for individualized exemptions, but "a categorical exemption for individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious objection." 117 The department exempted other officers for medical reasons, while refusing to

/06. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
I 07. See id at 54 7.
I 08. !d. at 537.
109. See id
110 See id
Ill. See id.
112. 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
113. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-66 (3d Cir.
1999).
114. Seeid.at367.
115. See hi. at 361.
I 16. !d. at 360.
117. !d at 365.
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exempt the Sunni Muslim officers. 118 Thus, not only did the policy fall
within the Smith individualized assessments exception, but it was also
119
evidence of discriminatory intent.
A Nebraska District Court also offered an interpretation of the Smith
exception. 120 In Rader v. Johnston, the district court held unconstitutional
a state university requirement that all incoming freshmen live oncampus.121 The plaintiff, a devout Christian and incoming freshman to
the University of Nebraska-Kearney (UNK), applied for an exemption
from the school's on-campus housing policy so he could live in the
Christian Student Fellowship (CSF) house, located off-campus. 122 UNK
administrators declined plaintiffs request. 123
The district court found the UNK on-campus housing policy to fall
within the Smith exception because administrators had previously
granted exemptions in a variety of different situations: to a student living
outside of Kearny who wished to drive his pregnant sister to work; to a
student who was depressed and experiencing headaches; to a student
with learning disabilities; and to a student who was mourning the death
of a parent. 124 Consequently, the district court held that the policy was
not one of general applicability and applied the compelling state interest
test. 125 The district court awarded plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. 126
Although the three previously cited cases demonstrate the viability of
the Smith exception in striking down government regulations on Free
Exercise grounds, they do not reveal precisely how the exception applies
to land use regulations. To date, there are no federal land use cases applying the Smith exception. The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has applied the exception to the City of Seattle's application of its
landmark preservation ordinance to a church.
In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 127 First Covenant Church
objected to the City's designation of its worship facility as a landmark
under the City's Landmark Preservation Ordinance. Seattle adopted this
ordinance "to: 'designate, preserve, [and] protect, ... improvements and
objects which reflect significant elements of the City's cultural, aesthetic,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
See 170 F.3d at 365.
See Raderv. Johnston. 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-53 (D. Ncb. 1996).
Seeid.atl558.
See id at 1544.
See id. at 1548.
Seeid.at1547.
See id at 1553.
See id. at 1558.
840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
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social, economic, political, architectural, engineering, historic, or other
heritage ... "' l2X
After designating the church as a landmark under the general ordinance, the City adopted a second ordinance specific to First Covenant. 129
This ordinance required the church to obtain a certificate of approval
prior to making particular alterations to the church's exterior. 130
The City, however, in the second ordinance, declared that nothing
prevented First Covenant from altering the church's exterior "when such
alterations are necessitated by changes in liturgy." 131 After an extensive
procedural history, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Seattle's ordinance designating First Covenant's church a landmark violated
the Free Exercise Clause. 132
The court gave two reasons why the landmark ordinance was not
generally applicable and therefore outside of the Smith ruling. First, the
court held that because the ordinance referred to "liturgy," it specifically
targeted religion. 133 Secondly, the court stated that the ordinance did not
fall within the Smith ruling, because it "invite[ d] individualized assessments of the subject property ... and contain[ ed] mechanisms for individualized exceptions." 134 The court did not elaborate on this conclusion,
but the language of the designation ordinance strongly suggests that the
Landmarks Prevention Board had significant discretionary decisionmaking authority. 135
First Covenant demonstrates that land use regulations can fall within
the Smith exception. Further, most zoning laws in the United States confer substantial discretionary decision-making power upon their governing
boards. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that a significant portion
of free exercise claims brought under RLUIPA section 2(a)(2)(c) will fall

128. !d. at 177 (quoting Seattle Municipal Code 25.12.020(B) (1977)).
129. See id. at 178.
130. See id.
131. !d.
132. See id. at 17S, 193. The Washington State Supreme Court first held that the designation
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause under the Sherbert compelling state interest test. See id.
at 178; First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Wash. 1990), vacated by
499 U.S. 90 I, ( 1991 ). The United States Supreme Court, however, granted Seattle's petition forcertiorari and vacated and remanded the case for further consideration under Smith. Sec First Covenant,
840 P.2d at 178; City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 499 U.S. 90 I ( 1991 ).
133. See First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 181.
134. ld
135. The ordinance provided: "When alterations necessitated by changes in liturgy are proposed, the owner shall advise the Landmarks Preservation Board in writing of the nature of the proposed alterations and the Board shall issue a Certificate of Approval. Prior to the issuance of any
Certificate, however, the Board and owner shall jointly explore such possible alternative design solutions as may be appropriale or necessary to preserve the destgnatedfeature.\· of"the landmark." !d. at
178 (emphasis added).

18

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVI

within Smith's individualized assessments exception and require strict
scrutiny review.
Congress, therefore, at least with section 2(a)(2)(c), does not appear
to have exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By merely requiring strict scrutiny review for claims
involving land use regulations that provide government officials the authority to make individualized assessments, RLUIPA does not intrude
upon the Supreme Court's power to interpret the Free Exercise Clause.
Unlike RFRA, which essentially attempted to reverse Smith, RLUIPA
works within the Court's opinion.

IV. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RLUIPA UNDER THE SUPREME
COURT'S ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS

A. In the Context ofLand Use Regulations, the Constitutional
Definitions of Substantial Burden and Religious Exercise Are Unclear
Although most zoning laws appear to fall within Smith's individualized assessments exception, RLUIPA raises additional constitutional
questions. RLUIPA requires courts to apply strict scrutiny review in
cases where governments impose or implement "land use regulation[ s] in
a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of
a person, assembly, or institution. 136 The problem with this language is
that in land use contexts, the definitions of "substantial burden" and "religious exercise" are not entirely clear.
Because these terms are not well-defined in the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, RLUIPA may face significant constitutional challenges. First, it may be that while land use regulations often create conflicts with religious exercise, they rarely place "substantial"
burdens upon religious institutions. Another possibility is that in many
cases, the claims brought by religious plaintiffs do not involve religious
exercise, as defined by the Court.
If, therefore, only a small percentage of religious land use cases involve substantial burdens of religious exercise, then courts will likely not
view RLUIPA as remedial or preventive. Instead, courts will be inclined
to strike RLUIPA down as a substantive change in Free Exercise law.
Determining the degree to which government burdens religious exercise is a well-established step in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence. 137 The Court, however, has not specified what con136. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)( I) (emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 ( 1972) ("A regulation neutral on its face
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stitutcs a substantial, or undue, burden upon free exercise in a land usc
context. Courts evaluating RLUIPA, therefore, will likely look to lower
federal court decisions for guidance on what constitutes a substantial
burden.
One circuit court decision that sheds some light on this issue is
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of" Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood. 13 x In Lakewood, the Congregation owned its existing worship
facility, located in one of the City's commercial districts, but wanted to
relocate to a larger facility in a residential district. 139 The City, however,
refused to grant the Congregation a special use permit to construct a
church building on the property it had pun.:hased. 140 The Sixth Circuit
held that the City's action made the Congregation's religious exercise
more expensive but was not an unconstitutional burden. 141
Another relevant circuit court decision is Rector, Wardens, and
Members of" Vestry of" St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York. 142
In St. Bartholomew's, the Second Circuit ruled that New York City officials did not violate the First Amendment in refusing to allow a church to
replace a building it owned with an office tower. 143 The Second Circuit
held that the City's designation of the church's Community House building as a landmark did not substantially burden the church's free exercise
rights. 144
In addition to "substantial burden," both Lakewood and St. Bartholomew's address the issue of what constitutes a "religious exercise" in
a land use context. In Lakewood, the Sixth Circuit held that "building and
owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, not a fundamental
tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs." 145 The court's language

may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.").
13X. 699 F.2d 303 (hlh Cir. 19X3).
139. See id at 304.
140. See id at 305.
141. See id at 30X-09. The court noted specifically that although the Congregation could construct a church in only ten percent of the City (the non-residential areas), it was free to purchase any
existing church in the remaining ninety 1Jercent. The court also stated that the zoning ordinance did
not prohibit the Congregation from worshiping in any part of the city.
142. 914 F.2d 34X (2d Cir. 1990).
143. Sec id at 355-56.
144. See id ("Incidental effects of government programs, which make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to
their religious beliefs, l do not] requin; government to bring forward a compelling justification for its
otherwise lawful actions."). The landmarks law at issue prevented any alteration or demolition of
stmctures designated as landmarks without approval of the Landmarks Commission. The City designated St. Bartholomew's Church and Community House as having special character and aesthetic
value to the heritage and culture of New York City. See id at 351.
145. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307.
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implies that as long as a religious group has some location in which to
gather and worship, then the government's prevention of the construction
of a worship facility will not invoke the First Amendment. 146 This assertion, however, is widely disputed. 147
St. Bartholomew's provides another perspective on the limits of "religious exercise" in a land use context. The Second Circuit understood
"Supreme Court decisions to indicate that neutral regulations that diminish the income of a religious organization do not implicate the free exercise clause." 148 It is uncertain, however, how this principle applies beyond the facts of the case.
In St. Bartholomew's, the Second Circuit held that the church failed
to prove its claim that converting the Community House into an office
tower was necessary for it to continue its existing religious activities. 149
But what if, instead of an office tower, the Church had planned to convert the Community House into a parochial school? 15 Further, assume
that the church had proven that without the increased revenue generated
by the school, it would not have been able to make the necessary repairs
to the church building. Under these circumstances, the Church's "religious exercise" is much more apparent. Applying the Second Circuit's
rationale, however, it is unclear whether such facts would render a different result.
The rulings in Lakewood and St. Bartholomew's are indicative of circuit court decisions involving religious land use issues. In virtually every
case, 151 circuit courts have ruled against the religious plaintiffs, finding
the burdens on free exercise to be insubstantial. 152

°

146. See id. ("The zoning ordinance does not prevent the Congregation from practicing its
faith through worship whether the worship be in homes, schools, other churches, or meeting halls
throughout the city."). The court, moreover, drew a line between the construction of a worship facility and the religious exercise in cases such as Yoder and Sherhert. The court concluded that the latter
involved religious practices deserving of First Amendment protection. while the former did not. See
id. at 306-07.
147. See Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at 726 ("The right to erect buildings where communities of faith may gather or to make use of existing buildings to fulfill a religiously mandated
mode of worship is ... a fundamental and indispensable aspect of the right to worship."); Laycock.
supra note 3, at 756 ("But the recognition of some limits docs not change the essential point: assembly for worship and other religious activities, and the creation of spaces in which such assemblies
may occur, is at the very core of religious liberty."); cf Scott David Godshall. Note, Land Us<' Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1574 (1984) (arguing that cases such
as Lakewood, where courts consider "the centrality of the practice to the religious group as a threshold matter," lead to "unnecessarily restrictive results").
148. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 ( 1990); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 ( 1989)).
149. See id. at 355-56.
150. Assume, arguendo, that converting the Community House into a school would require
structural changes that would invoke the landmarks law.
151. See, e.g, Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Francisco. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1'190)
(upholding City/County denial of conditional use permit to operate church in residential district);

I]

RLUIPA AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER

21

Circuit court decisions, however, do not reflect the vast majority of
conflicts between religious exercise and land use regulations. First, only
a small percentage of religious land usc cases are litigated in federal
court. 153 Second, the percentage of circuit court cases decided in favor of
the religious claimants is significantly less than for other cases. 154
Cases such as Lakewood and St. Bartholomew's are important in delineating the limits of what may constitute a substantial burden on free
exercise. Because circuit court decisions do not represent the majority of
religious land usc cases, however, courts should not over-emphasize
them in evaluating RLUIPA. State and federal district courts, as well as
commentators, offer alternative approaches to defining "substantial burden" and "religious exercise" in religious land usc cases.
One common scenario that raises questions of both substantial burden and free exercise arises when religious institutions run homeless
shelters. In Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of" Zoning Appeals, 155 for instance, a federal district court held that it was central to the Parish's
''faith to invite the homeless into the church to establish a climate of
worship." 151' Further, the court declared that the city's zoning ordinance
substantially burdened the Parish's religious exercise. 157
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (I Oth Cir. 1988) (upholding County's
denial of special usc permit to construct multi-purpose worship facility in agricultural district);
Grosz v. City of Miami Reach, 721 F.2d 729 (II th Cir. 1983) (upholding city's prohibition of Jewish
couple trom conducting worship services at their home, in violation of zoning ordinance).
152. But see Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988)
(finding City's denial of special usc permit "more than [an] incidental" burden on the Islamic Center's right to religious assembly, because it left "no practical alternatives for establishing a mosque in
the city limits"); Viii. of Univ. Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphan's Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir.
1927) (reversing Villiagc's denial of special usc permit for the construction of orphanage). Islamic
Cent a is also a good example of a pre-Smith case to which the individualized assessments exception
would have applied. Starkville's zoning ordinance prohibited the use of buildings as worship centers
in the area surrounding the Mississippi State University campus without a special use permit. Prior
to the Islamic Center's application, however, the City's Board of Aldermen had granted special usc
permits to all nine Christian churches that applied. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, rejected the City's
claim that its denial of the permit was based solely on concerns over '"traffic control and public
safety." Islamic Ctr., X40 F.2d at ~02.
153. Sec Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at 736-53. In their article, Keetch and Richards
reveal and evaluate the tlndings of a 1997 study of religious land use cases in the United States. The
study examined a total of 196 cases decided between 1921 and 1996. Of the 196 cases, federal courts
decided only twenty-six, or 13'X,. Circuit courts decided eleven of the twenty-six federal cases.
154. Si'c id Of the twenty-six federal cases. religious claimants received favorable rulings in
twelve, or 46%. For circuit court decisions, the percentage of favorable rulings was 36",{, (four favorable rulings out of eleven total decisions). In contrast, the percentage of favorable rulings in state
court decisions was 62% (I 06 favorable rulings out of 170 total decisions).
155. 946 F. Supp. 1225 (E. D. Va. 1996 ). In Stuart Circle Parish, the Parish sought a temporary restraining order against the City of Richmond's zoning board to preclude it from enforcing
restrictions on its Meal Ministry program-a weekly service designed to feed and provide worship
and pastoral care for Richmond's urban poor.
156. ld at 1239.
157. Si!e id. Richmond's zoning ordinance restricted feeding and housing programs for home-
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In Stuart Circle Parish, the court, in determining the level of burden
and nature of the religious exercise, adopted a t1exible approach that was
relatively deferential to the Parish. 158 First, the court stated that one of the
factors to be considered "in determining the substantiality of the burden"
was "whether a particular practice is mandated by religion or simply encouraged."159 Moreover, the court held that "[a]nother factor that obviously must be taken into account ... is the extent of the interference." 160
Finally, the court held that even though the Parish could, under the terms
of the ordinance, continue to feed the poor in some capacity, it could not
161
fulfill its religious mission.
In addition to homeless shelters, courts in other land use contexts
have applied standards for defining "substantial burden on free exercise"
that are more deferential to religious claimants. In Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Commissioners, 162 for instance, the court examined the
question of whether the County "impermissibly burdened the religious
activities of the Church" by refusing to allow the Church to operate a
163
private school at its facility.
The court, in holding that the County violated the Free Exercise Clause, declared that "the conduct of a school
within the church building is integrally related to the religious belief of

less to no more than thirty individuals and for no more than seven days between October and April.
With Meal Ministry, the Parish served approximately one hundred people each Sunday afternoon
throughout the year. Under the terms of the ordinance, therefore, the Parish was prohibited from
serving the poor for 45 out of 52 Sundays. And even on those rare Sundays when it would be allowed to operate Meal Ministry, it would have to tum away more than half of the people who typically attend. To the court, this forced the Parish to abstain from a religiously mandated action. See
id.
!58. But see First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 424 (II th Cir.) (upholding
County's closure of church's homeless shelter on grounds that the burden on the church to "move
the shelter to an appropriately zoned area, is less than the burden on the County were it to be forced
to allow the zoning violation") (quoting Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741) modified on denial ofreh 'g 27 F.3d
526 ( 1994). In following Grosz, the First Assembly court's balance tipped in favor of the government's interests. See infra note 209.
1.59. Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp. at 1238 (quoting Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702,
703 (D. Md. 1996)).
160. !d. at 1238. The court also cited Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996),
which held that a substantial burden under RFRA was "one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain trom religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests
a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to
those beliefs."
161 See Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp. at 1236. In declaring the Meal Ministry a legitimate religious exercise, the court cited an expert witness in Christian theology who "testified that
feeding the poor is central to the Christian teachings of all denominations comprising the Stuart Circle Parish." /d. The court's contemplative analysis of the Parish's situation differs significantly from
the Sixth Circuit's approach in Lakewood. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
162. 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. !994).
163. !d. at 992. The Church resided in an agricultural and forestry district (AF-1 ), where
churches were penni !led by right, but private schools were permitted only upon issuance of a special
usc permit. Such schools were considered "contingent uses" in the County's land use code.
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the church membership." 164 The district court's evaluation of "religious
exercise" differs significantly from the approaches taken by circuit courts
in cases such as Lakewood and St. Bartholomew 's. 165
In similar fashion, the Washington Supreme Court demonstrated significant concern for the church plaintiff in Firs·t United Methodist
Church ofSeattle v. Hearing Examinerfor the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board. 166 In First United Methodist, the City's Landmarks Preservation Board designated the interior and exterior of First United Methodist's church building a landmark. Consequently, the Church was
prohibited from making alterations to the building "without City approval unless such changes [were] necessitated by changes in the liturgy."I67
The Church, however, disputed the landmark designation, arguing
that the church structure had deteriorated to a point where it could no
longer afford the necessary repairs. 16 x The court accepted the Church's
arguments and held that the landmark ordinance "severely" burdened
First United Methodist's free exercise of religion. 169 The court held the
Church should be free to "[sell] its property and [use] the proceeds to advance its religious mission." 170 As with Stuart Circle Parish and Alpine
Christian Fellowship, the Washington Supreme Court's approach to

!64. !d. at 994. Interestingly, the court cited Emplovment Div. v. S'mith, 494 U.S. X72 ( !990).
but only to establish that the burden on religious exercise must be "substantial" to constitute a constitutional violation. See Alpine Christian Fellowship, g7() f. Supp. at 994. The court did not discuss
whether the County's land usc code was a "neutral law of general applicability." Language in the
opinion, however, suggests that the court considered the County's action to be targeted at the
Church's religious mission: "The restriction on the educational usc of the building is not different. in
principle, trom a government imposed restriction on the religious ceremonial practices in the
church." !d. at 995.
!65. See supra notes !45-!50 and accompanying text. The district court in Alpine Christian
Fellowship also deviated from the traditional approach taken by the Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals in Free Exercise Clause cases. Historically. these courts have rejected claims against government regulation of religious conduct. See Marci Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the
Supreme Court's Free Ewrcise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of'the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 7!3 (!993) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court's approach to
Free Exercise Clause cases, with very few exceptions, has been to declare restrictions upon religious
belief as unconstitutional, but to allow government regulation of religious conduct).
166. 9l6P.2d374(Wash.l996).
!67. !d. at376.
!68. The Church also claimed that changes in the neighborhood surrounding the church had
dramatically reduced its membership. lt argued that the present size of the sanctuary was "'too large
to foster as dynamic and meaningful worship services as desired." !d. Moreover. the church maintained that it should be allowed to sell any portion of its property to "fund religious and social service programs." !d.
!69. !d. at38l.
!70. !d. The court also speculated on the constitutional impact of alternative religious uses or
land. For instance, the court asked "lf the congregation decided that the building should be operated
exclusively as a soup kitchen. would that be a cessation of religious purpose' 1" /d. at 3XO. (quoting
Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society at l 1-!2).
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evaluating the level of burden on religious exercise differs significantly
from that taken by most circuit courts.
As the foregoing analysis has shown, the meanings of "substantial
burden" and "religious exercise" in land use cases are not clearly established.171 While some actions certainly reside outside constitutional
boundaries, 172 others are more problematic. 173 Some of RLUIPA 's other
land use provisions, however, raise even more difficult definitional issues.

B. The Judicial Definition of "Less than Equal Terms" Is Also
Indeterminate
Section 2(b) of RLUIPA, entitled "Discrimination and Exclusion,"
contains the statute's remaining land use provisions. This section contains terms that are even more ambiguous than "substantial burden" and
"religious exercise." For example, section 2(b )(1) states: "No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution." 174 The key phrase in this section is
"less than equal terms."
Unlike "substantial burden," which has long been part of the Court's
vernacular, "less than equal terms" or similar phrases do not typically
appear in free exercise cases. Even Congress, in the legislative record for
RLUIPA, did not make it abundantly clear what constitutes unequal

171. Notably, in one of the first federal cases involving RLUIPA's land use provisions, a district court denied the plaintiffs' free exercise claims on grounds that the zoning ordinance, on its face
and as applied, did not substantially burden the free exercise of religion. See C.L.U.B. v. City of
Chicago, No. 94CV6151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3791 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 200I).In C.L.U.B., the
district court set a high bar for the plaintiffs to establish a substantial burden. The court declared: "A
substantial burden exists when the government pressures a plaintiff to modify her behavior and violate her beliefs, by, for example, discriminating against her because of her religious bcliet~ inhibiting
her dissemination of particular religious views or pressuring her to forgo a religious practice." !d. at
*33.
172. See, e.g, Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, R59 F.2d 820, 826 ( 1988) (declaring that a church docs not "have a constitutional right to build its house of worship where it
pleases") (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602 (1971)); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of
Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the city violated the First Amendment
by denying a special use permit to Islamic Center, when it had previously awarded similar permits to
nine different Christian Churches); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 72 I F.2d 729, 736 (I 983) (holding that laws interfering only with religious claimants' "secular, philosophical, or personal choices"
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause)(citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 2 I 5-16 (I 972);
EEOC v. Miss. Coli., 626 F.2d 477, 488 ( 1980)).
I 73. See. e.g., First United Methodist, 916 P.2d at 380 (noting, without drawing constitutional
conclusions, that religious property uses include "education, day care, the provision of food and
shelter, counseling, and retreats") (citing Brief of amici curiae Christian Legal Society at I 1-12).
I 74. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, ~ 2(b )(I).
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treatment. 175 Some of the anecdotal evidence in the legislative record,
however, provides guidance as to what types of situations Congress may
have been referring.
Illinois Congressman Henry J. Hyde, for instance, presented the case
of a church in Grand Haven, Michigan that signed a lease for a storefront
property and then applied for a building permit to modify the space. 176
City officials, however, informed the church that zoning regulations prohibited religious meetings and worship at that location. 177 City officials
claimed the zoning ordinance for the business (B 1) district in which the
church's property resides did not allow houses of worship as ofright. m
The ordinance did, however, specifically allow "private clubs and
schools, fraternal organizations, concert halls, and funeral homes." 179 In
response, the church argued that it was obviously a "place of public assembly," but city officials disagreed and denied the permit. 1so Ultimately,
after a religious liberties defense organization filed suit against Grand
Haven on behalf of the church, city attorneys agreed to terms of a consent judgment that granted a building permit to the church. 181
The Grand Haven ordinance appears to demonstrate the unequal
treatment Congress intended section 2(b )( 1) to prevent. The impact of
secular assemblies and institutions the ordinance allowed in the B I district is similar to, if not greater than, churches or other houses of worship.
For instance, the traffic generated by concert halls on the night of a performance is at least equivalent to that of a typical church service. Moreover, a private school located in the business district would engender
more significant safety concerns than a house of worship.
Despite Grand Haven and other examples of land use regulations
treating religious assemblies on "less than equal terms" than secular assemblies, it is unclear whether the problem is pervasive enough to save
section 2(b)(l). 182 Based on Flores and the Court's subsequent Section 5
175. Representative Charles T. Canady, the House's chief sponsor of RLUIPA, did state that
"less than equal terms ... more squarely addresses the case in which the unequal treatment of different land uses docs not fall into any apparent pattern." 146 CONG. RI'C. El563 (daily cd. Sept. 22,
2000) (statement by Rep. Canady). This claritication, however, is oflittlc use without context.
176. See 146 CONG. REC. El564 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (document submitted by Rep.
Hyde).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. ld
180. Jd
ItO. See Haven Shores Cmty. Church v. City of Grand Haven, File No. I :00-cv-175 (W.O.
Mich. Dec. 20, 2000) (consent judgment). In the consent judgment, District Court Judge David W.
McKeague stated that Grand Haven's zoning ordinance would not survive review under RLUIPA
because it "prohibited a church or other religious use in" the district. !d. From this language, it is not
clear what specific section(s) ofRLUIPA Judge McKeague believed the ordinance to have violated.
182. Another example of unequal treatment appears in the previously cited case of C.L.U.B. v.
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cases, Congress must demonstrate that unequal treatment of religious assemblies results in substantial numbers of constitutional violations. 1x3 If
not, then the Court will likely consider section 2(b )(I) to be neither re. I nor preventive.
. IX4
me d1a
Does the Court, however, truly intend for Congress to demonstrate
widespread patterns of constitutional violations for every law it passes
under the Enforcement Clause? For instance, assume, for the sake of argument, that the Court recently declared homosexuals to be a suspect
class. 1x5 Would a subsequent law prohibiting states from criminalizing
homosexual sodomy be valid under Section 5? 1x6
In this hypothetical situation, Congress would appear to be well
within its Enforcement Clause power. The law would simply prevent

City of Chicago. No. 94CVfl 151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 3791 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2001 ). See supra
note 171. In C.L. UB., the city's zoning ordinance required religious institutions to obtain special usc
permits for establishing worship centers in all business, commercial, and manufacturing districts,
while allowing as of right "clubs and lodges," "meeting halls," and "recreation buildings and community centers." !d. at *fl-7. The city, however, in response to litigation, amended the ordinance's
language to require special use permits for the secular uses. See id. at *7.
I R3. Sec, <'.g. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 640 ( 1999) ("In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."); Flori's, 521 U.S.
at 530 (holding that the legislative record for RFRA. unlike the records in the Voting Rights Act
cases. lacked "examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry").
I R4. Section 2(b) of RLUIPA contains two other main subsections: section 2(b )(2), titled
"Nondiscrimination," and section 2(b)(3). titled "Exclusions and Limits." Each of these faces its own
constitutional dit1iculties. First. although the meaning of 2(b)(2) is much less ambiguous than
2(b )(I )--the definition of religious discrimination is well-established in equal protection and employment discrimination law--the record of land usc regulations discriminating against religious
assemblies and institutions may be insufficient.
Similarly, there is little ambiguity in subsection 2(b)(3)(a), which states that "no government shall
impose or implement a land use regulation that totally excludes religious assemhliesfi·om ajurisdiction. "Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act~ 2(b)(3)(a). Despite the "not in my
backyard" opposition to religious assemblies in many areas. however, it is far from certain that
courts will find that such evidence meets the "congruence and proportionality" test. See Laycock.
supra note 3, at 759-63 for discussion of land use regulations and the exclusion of houses of worship.
hnally. subscctiun 2(b)(3)(b) may have a definitional problem similar to the "less than equal terms"
language in subsection 2(b)( I). Subsection 2(b)(3)(b) prohibits governments from imposing or implementing land usc regulations that '"unreasonably rlimit] religious assemblies, institutions. or structures within a JUrisdiction." Religious Land Usc and Institutionalized Persons Act ~ 2(b)(3)(b).
While "reasonableness" is certainly common in torts and other areas of law, courts reviewing
RI.U!Pi\ may find it diflicult to define precisely what constitutes an "unreasonable limit" on a religious assembly. institution. or structure.
I X5. Under the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence. homosexuals are not defined as
either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, fl32 (1996) (applying rational basis test to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited legislative. executive, orjudicial actions designed to offer special protection to homosexuals).
I X6. In Bowers v. Hardwick. 47R U.S. I X6 ( 1986), the Court upheld an equivalent Georgia
statute on grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment did not create a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
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states from violating the Equal Protection Clause as defined by the Supreme Court. However, under the standard established by Flores and
subsequent cases, Congress would be unable to compile a significant record of constitutional violations. Even for the states that have antisodomy statutes, they are almost never enforced. 187
Similarly, Professor Laycock has argued that prior to Flores, Congress passed many statutes for which substantial legislative records of
constitutional violations were not established. 1x8 For instance, Laycock
noted that in 1978 when Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, the Supreme Court had held that pregnancy discrimination violated
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Title VII. 1x9 Therefore if Congress were to pass the same legislation today, the Court would have sig190
nificant difficulty in upholding it.
C. Whether RLUJPA 's Land Use Provisions Are Remedial or Preventive

in Nature is an Open Question
Despite the glaring inconsistency between Flores and some earlier
statutes passed under the Enforcement Clause, RLUIPA 's land use provisions will likely have to meet Flores's congruence and proportionality
standard to pass constitutional inspection. The congruence prong should
not be a significant hurdle because RLUIPA's land use provisions only
target land use regulations that substantially burden the free exercise of
religion. The proportionality prong, however, will be more troublesome.
As previously shown, the application of most land use regulations in
the United States likely falls under Smith's individualized assessments
exception. Because the constitutional definitions of "substantial burden
on free exercise" and "less than equal terms," are somewhat unclear,
however, it is not certain whether RLUIPA's application of strict scrutiny is proportional to the frequency with which land use regulations violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The Flores Court, in addition to depicting Congress's enforcement
power under Section 5 as remedial and preventive, declared that the
power to enforce does not include the power to alter the meaning of constitutional provisions. 191 Stated differently, "Congress docs not enforce a

187. See Bowers. 478 U.S. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the historical lack of enforcement of the Georgia statute).
18R See Laycock, supra note 39, at 747 n.l9.
I R9. See id. at 753.
190. See id. ("There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act is congruent with and proportionate to any constitutional violations as the Court defines them.").
191. Se!' Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
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192
constitutional right by changing what the right is."
Consequently, if the Court were to determine that land use regulations so infrequently place substantial burdens on religious exercise, then
it would also likely conclude that with RLUIPA, Congress intended to
change the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The rationale for such a
conclusion would resemble the following: "Land use regulations only
occasionally infringe upon the free exercise rights of individuals and religious institutions. Congress, therefore, by requiring strict scrutiny review of land use regulations that place substantial burdens on religious
exercise, attempted to change the existing judicial interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. In other words, Congress tried to create constitutional rights that did not exist."
In Flores, the Court held that the legislative record for RFRA did not
reflect a widespread pattern of religious discrimination. 193 Indeed, the
Court concluded that the legislative record for RFRA only revealed "incidental" burdens, which was inconsistent with the law's stated purpose.194 Moreover, the Court concluded that RFRA 's scope--"displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and subject matter"-was severely "out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
. ob'~ect. ,\9'preventive
In contrast to RFRA, the legislative history for RLUIPA demonstrates a significant record of land use regulations substantially interfering with religious assembly. 196 Furthermore, the record supporting
RLUIPA documents many instances in which localities have used land
use regulations in arbitrary, even discriminatory, manners to prevent the
197
establishment of houses of worship.
Congress, keenly aware of the

192. ld
193. See id at 532. Professor Laycock, who served as lead counsel lilr Archbishop Flores,
subsequently explained the reason for RFRA 's scant legislative record. First. he noted that no one
foresaw that documenting large numbers of constitutional violations in the record would have any
constitutional significance. See Laycock, supra note 39, at 774-75. A second reason Professor Laycock offered was that RFRA's proponents could not illustrate the most egregious examples of Free
Exercise violations, "because, almost by definition, seriously persecuted religions arc highly unpopular." !d at 775. Specifically, he noted that when Representative Stephen Solarz, RFRA 's chief
sponsor in the House, sought to file a congressional amicus brief for Lukumi, no\ a single representative or senator would agree to sign it. Sec id at 776. The peculiar "Santeria religion was too unpopular to touch." ld
194. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530.
195. ld at 532.
196. See H.R. REP. No. I 06-219, at I X-24 ( 1999); Laycock, supra note 3 at 769-X3. Both II.R.
REP. No. 106-219, which was originally submilled as part of the record for the "Religious Liberty
Protection Act of 1999," and the Laycock article arc cited in 146 CoN<i. RH. S7774 (daily ed. July
27, 2000) (exhibit submitted by Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). Sel' also Keetch and Richards. supra
note 3. The study that Keetch and Richards summarize in their article is also cited in H.R. Rt'P. No.
I 06-219.
197. See infra notes 20:2-203 and accompanying text.

1]

RLUIPA AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER

29

Court's skeptical view of its Enforcement Clause power, went to great
lengths to demonstrate that RLUIPA was preventive and remedial legislation.
The Supreme Court's recent evaluation of the legislative record for
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provides another
point of comparison for RLUIPA. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 19R the Court held that Congress failed to demonstrate "any pattern
of age discrimination by the States." 199 As a result, the Court concluded
that ADEA was not preventive, but substantive in nature. ADEA, the
Court declared, prohibited "substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional" under the
Court's equal protection standard of review for age discrimination
laws.Z00
In contrast to ADEA, Congress provided what it believed to be a
substantial record of statistical and anecdotal evidence indicating unconstitutional religious discrimination in land use regulation? 01 The record
for RLUIPA indicates that local government officials, exercising "virtually unlimited discretion," frequently deny permits to religious organizations in arbitrary and discriminatory fashions. 202 Moreover, the record
indicates that minority religious groups are vastly over-represented in
land use litigation, indicating discriminatory treatment. 203 Finally, therecord provides some evidence that there is a substantial disparity between
the number of reported religious land use cases and actual conflicts be. .
. .
tween re lIgJOus
orgamzatwns
an d 1an d use regu 1ators. 204
198. 528 u s. 62 (2000).
199. ld at 89.
200. !d. at 86. Specifically, the Court cited several of its own decisions where it held that age
classifications are presumptively rational. The Court further noted that even when States rely on
"broad generalizations," such laws do "not violate the Equal Protection Clause." !d. at 84-85.
201. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18.
202. !d. at 18-22. For example, the report cites evidence where non-religious assemblies such
as community centers, health clubs. lodges, and museums "arc often permitted as of right in zones
where churches require a special use permit, or permitted on special use pennit where churches are
wholly excluded." !d. at 19-20.
203. !d. at 20-21. Specifically, the report states that "Jews, small Christian denominations, and
nondenominational churches arc vastly overrepresented in reported church zoning cases .... Religious groups accounting for only 9% of the population account for 50% of the reported litigation
involving location of churches and 34% of the reported litigation involving accessory uses at existing churches." !d. This same evidence is also summarized in Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at
736-42.
204. H.R. REP. No. I 06-219, at 21 (noting that over a five-year period while "roughly 325 to
400" Presbyterian congregations reported conflicts over land use permits, there were only five total
reported cases involving Presbyterian churches): cf Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious
Freedom Legislation, and Why they are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 421 (1999). Professor
Berg explains that free exercise "disputes are more likely to be settled when the government has a
weak reason for its policy or it can easily accommodate the needs of the religious believer." !d. Berg
further notes that religious freedom legislation gives religious believers and organizations "real lev-
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Based on the foregoing, it is doubtful that courts reviewing RLUIPA
will reach conclusions similar to the Supreme Court's concerning
ADEA. In Kimel, the Court held that Congress failed to identify "any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."205 With RLUIPA, Congress appears to have met this minimum requirement. Whether the record establishes RLUIPA's land use provisions
as valid exercises of Congress's Enforcement Clause power, however, is
a much more difficult question.
First, reviewing courts' interpretations of "substantial burden" and
"religious exercise" will be critical. If courts apply the most restrictive
interpretations of these terms, then they will likely fail to regard all but
the most egregious examples as unconstitutiona1. 206 Additionally, courts
may conclude that there is insufficient evidence to establish that governments frequently "impose or implement land use regulations" in manners
which treat religious assemblies on "less than equal terms" with secular
assemblies. 207
Finally, it is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that courts will strike
down RLUIPA's land use provisions on grounds that strict scrutiny, historically, has failed to effectively protect religious conduct. As some
commentators have noted, the Supreme Court has demonstrated only a
"flickering commitment" to the compelling state interest test. 20 g Moreover, circuit courts have tended to support governmental interests in religious land use cases. 209
Considering this history, it is possible that courts reviewing RLUIPA
will undervalue the religious interests in land use cases. The difficulty, as
one commentator notes, is that zoning ordinances are typically linked to
"at least one extremely significant public value" such as protecting the

erage in negotiating with government officials--{forcing them] to give some consideration to religious claims when they otherwise would not." !d.
205. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
206. For example, if reviewing courts look only at circuit court religious land use cases and
their respective intcrpretatit>ns of what constitutes a "substantial burden on religious exercise," then
perhaps Islamic Center will represent the model for Free Exercise violations; see supra note 151. If
so, then the vast majority of evidence presented by Congress in support of RLUIP A will prove futile.
207. Religious Land Usc and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(b)( I). Recall, however, that
RLUJPA contains a severability clause. See id.§ 5(i). Therefore, the Court could, for instance, uphold section 2(a)(2)(c) and strike down 2(b)( I).
208. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 25, at 450 (noting the rare occasions in which the Court,
prior to Smith, upheld claims involving religious conduct exemptions to neutral laws).
209. See, e.g, Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 739 (II th Cir. 1983) ('Together,
the important objectives underlying zoning and the degree of infringement of those objectives
caused by allowing the religious conduct to continue place a heavy weight on the government's side
of the balancing scale.").
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public health, safety, or welfare. 210 As a result, religious demands "often
. k.
.
,211
ten d to shnn
m companson.
Courts preconceived to view governmental interests in regulating
land use as more important than the needs of religious communities to
have appropriate facilities in which to worship will likely view strict
scrutiny as excessive. Correspondingly, such courts will be less inclined
to declare RLUIPA as either remedial or preventive. Conversely, courts
could recognize that a legitimate balancing of religious and governmental interests would render RLUIPA's use of strict scrutiny as an effective
method for protecting the right to religious assembly in many cases. 212

D. RLUIPA Invokes Federalism Concerns Because Land Use Is an Area
ofLaw Regulated by State and Local Governments
Closely related to the issue of whether Congress, by enacting
RLUIPA's land use provisions, acted within the scope of its Enforcement
Clause power are concerns over federalism. Issues regarding Congress's
possible encroachment upon state and local authority are primarily structural in nature. 213 Flores and subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing
with Section 5 hold that the Constitution places distinct limits on Congress's powers over the states. 214
Numerous reasons exist for the constitutionally imposed restraints on
Congress's powers over the States. Federalism protects "liberty by dispersing governmental power," brings "government closer to the people,"
permits "the law to be tailored to local circumstances and local political
preferences" and allows local governments to experiment with legislative
2 I 0. Godshall, supra note I 46, at I 576.
2 I I !d.
212. See Colin L. Black, Comment; The Free Exercise Clause and Historic Preservation Law:
Suggestions/or a More Coherent Free Exercise Analysis, 72 TUL. L. REV. I 767, 1803 (1998) (arguing that a proper balancing of governmental and religious interests would produce more coherent and
consistent results in religious land use cases).
213. See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 701 n.9 (stating that in Flores, the Court "engaged in
structural analysis" when it asked "the categorical question whether" Congress, with RFRA, acted
"within the boundaries of its constitutionally circumscribed powers"). Of course the Tenth Amendment specifically addresses the powers retained by the "States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X. The primary purpose of the Tenth Amendment, however, like the Ninth, is to
delineate the Constitution's structural protection of liberty.
214. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516 ("Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of
enumerated powers .... Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far-reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements
on the States.") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)
("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution. 'The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."') (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, I 76
(I 803 )).
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and administrative actions. 215 These benefits of local control apply directly to land use regulation.
Local governments are generally better able to respond to their constituents' concerns over land use issues than Congress or federal executive agencies. Local officials have the ability to take quick (on a government responsiveness scale, anyway) administrative and legislative
actions, to hear complaints from residents over proposed land uses and to
grant variances or special use permits for non-conforming uses. And
consequently Congress, by passing land use legislation, risks interfering
with an area of law designed to be controlled at the state and local
level. 216
One of the principal reasons for RFRA's demise was its extensive interference with state law. Both the Flores Court and RFRA's critics expressed this concern. In Flores, the Court declared that RFRA, by "[requiring] searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant
likelihood of invalidation," intruded considerably "into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens." 217 Similarly, Professors Eisgruber and Sager
argued that "RFRA's displacement of state authority [was] unusually
broad," potentially affecting nearly all state laws.m
With RLUIPA, Congress diffused the "unlimited scope" objections
that befell RFRA by limiting the categories of state laws subject to strict
scrutiny review. Nonetheless, because RLUIPA's land use provisions require judicial review of state laws and decisions, the same federalism issues apply. Professor Conkle, in his article anticipating RLUIPA-like
legislation, discussed the federalism implications of such a law in detail. 219
According to Conkle's analysis, even if a court were to declare
RLUIPA a valid exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause power, it is
possible that it would hold it unconstitutional based solely on independent state sovereignty prindples.Z 2° Conkle based his argument on the
Court's noted federalism rulings in New York v. United Statei 21 and
215. Daniel 0. Conkle, Free Exercise, Federalism, and the States as Laboratories, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 493, 494-95 ( 1999).
216. Recall that with the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, the Commerce Department did not
impose its provisions upon the states. Instead, it designed the act only to serve as a model for states
adopting their own zoning enabling laws. Sec supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
217. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534.
218. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 25, at 464. The authors also characterized RFRA as "capricious," repeating their assertion that strict scrutiny was inconsistent with the Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. !d.
219. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 654-60.
220. See id. at 658-60.
221. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In New York, the Court struck down a provision of the Radioactive
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Printz v. United States. 222 He asserted that the Court could very we II declare that a law such as RLUIPA, which regulates state and local governments' regulation of land use, is an unacceptable congressional intrusion.223 After all, as the Court declared in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 224 "the
Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles offederalism."225
Despite the legitimate constitutional arguments for protecting state
and local governments from federal interference, there is another important aspect of federalism ignored by the Court's recent decisions. Federalism is a structural threat to liberty. 226 As Professor Laycock explains,
federalism probably protected constitutional liberties in an era of limited
government. 227 In an era of big government, however, particularly "without vigorous enforcement of constitutional rights, federalism becomes a
serious structural threat to liberty." 228
Laycock argues that today, with so many different government entities possessing the power to restrict liberty, federalism, "in conjunction
with the administrative state," increases the threat to religious freedom.229 He declares that in this environment, the only real enforcement

Waste Policy Amendments Act of 19X5 (42 U.S.C.S. § 2021 b) requiring states to take title of lowlevel radioactive waste produced in their state or assume liability for damages resulting from the its
failure to take possession of such waste. See id. at 174-86. The Court declared that "[ w ]hether one
views the take title provision as lying outside Congress's enumerated powers, or as infringing upon
the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with
the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution." !d. at 177.
222. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Printz, essentially a struch1ral ruling, struck down provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ( 18 U.S.C. § 922) requiring local law enforcement officials
in some states to perfonn background checks on persons attempting to purchase handguns. See id. at
902-03. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that the Brady Act provisions, because they were
not properly grounded on any of Congress's enumerated powers, and required officers "to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program," were therefore "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty." !d. at 935.
223. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 660 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166). Conkle also noted,
however, that the laws at issue in both New York and Printz were based on the Commerce Clause,
and therefore the rulings do not apply directly to laws based on Section 5. See Conkle, supra note
40, at 659 n.l31. As he stated in a previous article, "principles of state sovereignty that might limit
congressional power under Article I do not apply when Congress properly invokes enforcement
power under the Civil War Amendments." Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: The Constitutional SiRnificance of' an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 71 n.l62
( 1995) (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 ( 1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). New York and Printz would, of course, apply to section 2(a)(2)(b) of
RLUIPA, which is grounded on Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
224. 501 U.S.452(1991).
225. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 659 n.l31 (quoting Gregon•, 501 U.S. at 469).
226. See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 68 ( 1998).
22 7. See id. at 80.
228 !d.
229. !d. at 81. Laycock notes that each of the following governmental actions may prohibit
religious practices: "an act of Congress, a regulation of a federal agency, an act of a state legislature,
a regulation of a state agency, an act of a county board or a county agency, an act of a city council or
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of religious and other constitutional liberties occurs at the federal level.
Specifically, Congress and the federal judiciary are the only viable
. ~tOr l'b
sources o f protectiOn
1 erty. 230
·
Professor Laycock therefore contends that the Court, by pruning
Congress's Enforcement Clause powers, has endangered religious and
other constitutional liberties. 231 Moreover, recent efforts to restrict judicial scrutiny of individual rights exacerbate the problem. As another
commentator explains, judicial enforcement of individual rights is necessary, because "the political process left to itself may not adequately protect the rights of minorities and dissenters." 232 This argument is especially germane to the current analysis if the statistics on the overrepresentation of minority religions in land use cases are accepted. 233
The argument that a national government provides greater protection
for the rights of minority groups than state and local governments is not
of recent origin. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison explained that a
"well-constructed Union" tends "to break and control the violence of faction."234 Madison argued that a republic is superior to a pure democracy
because the government encompasses a "greater number of citizens and
extent of territory." 235 This factor, Madison declared, "renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded." 236 Similarly, though factious leaders
may exert tremendous influence at local, and even state levels, the "Union" will typically preclude them from exerting influence over other
states. 237
The federalism implications of RLUIPA's land use provisions engender persuasive arguments on both sides. Based on Flores and the
Court's other recent Section 5 cases, however, it is doubtful that arguments such as Professor Laycock's will receive significant consideration.

city agency, an act of a special purpose district, a state court exercising common law powers, or a
federal court sitting in diversity and predicting common law developments." /d.
230. See id. at 81-82.
231. See id. at 82 ("Pulling Congress out of the balance fimdamentally changes the structure of
liberty in our country. It fundamentally changes the relation of federalism to liberty, because it
leaves all these multiple sources of regulation with no central or unified source of power to protect
liberty.").
232. William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures o/ Process Fcdaalism,
22 HI\RY. J.L. & PUH. POL'Y 139, 155 {199X).
233. See supra note 203.
234. THE FEDERALIST No. I 0, at 129 (James Madison) (Howard Mumford Jones cd., 1% I).
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
/d. at 130.
235. !d. at 135.
236. !d.
237. !d. at 135-36.
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Yet, predicting the Court's future treatment of legislation is anything but
an exact science. 23 x
V. CONCLUSION

At a minimum level, RLUIPA's land use provisions are distinct from
RFRA and the subsequent statutes the Court struck down as exceeding
Congress's Enforcement Clause power. Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA's land
use provisions do not implicate virtually every area of state law. Furthermore, most land use regulations in America, through the granting of
variances and special use permits, do not operate as neutral, generally
applicable laws. Consequently Congress, by requiring strict scrutiny review for the imposition and implementation of land use regulations that
place substantial burdens on religious exercise, does not appear to have
altered the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Moreover, in contrast to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA'') and the Patent Remedy Act, the legislative history for
RLUIPA demonstrates at least a significant and growing problem with
land use regulations infringing upon the right to religious assembly. 239
Whether the congressional record for RLUIP A illustrates a widespread
pattern of First Amendment violations is debatable but is not an outlandish assertion.
Thus it appears that RLUIPA's land use provisions grounded on
Congress's Enforcement Clause power meet many of the Court's core
concerns in Flores and subsequent cases. As a result, despite other important constitutional concerns, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
will strike down all of RLUIPA's land use provisions. If the Court were
to make such a ruling, then the viability of Section 5 as a means for protecting constitutional liberties would certainly be in doubt. 240

238. Professor Laycock succinctly illustrates this point: "I confidently expected to win the
Flores case." Laycock, supra note 39. at 743.
239. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (declaring that the ADEA prohibited "very little conduct likely
to be held unconstitutional"); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (holding that with the Patent Remedy
Act, "Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on part of the States").
240. Considering RLUIPA's formidable legislative history, a Supreme Court ruling striking
down all of the land use provisions would essentially establish that only laws equivalent to the Voting Rights Act are valid exercises of Congress's Section 5 power. Sec, e.g., South Carolina v.
Katzcnhach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). And although racial discrimination by state actors certainly still
exists in the United States, it seems improbable that the current Congress could enact a law designed
to remedy equal protection violations that would engender a record of unconstitutional conduct surpassing that ofRLUIPA.

